Authority comparison
Authority control for agent-to-agent work
Handoff
Workbench
Define work. Bound authority. Approve transfer. Verify outcome.
Delegation becomes unsafe when a receiving agent can silently gain access, spend money, or substitute itself into work. Workbench turns each transfer into a bounded, signed, human-approved lifecycle with evidence at the end.
Synthetic dependency-security review · no credential fields · no external service · money set to NONE
Authoritative workspace
A controlled path from proposal to proof
Preparing your local workspace
The signed application state will appear here.
- Version
- 0
- Events
- 0
- Responsible now
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Human decision and next action
No authority moves without an exact decision.
Review the recipient, limits, expiration, digest, and protocol before approving.
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Protocol 1.0 · State version
1
These controls invoke the real signed application service. The interface cannot skip cryptographic or policy checks.
Advanced signed handoff JSON
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Custom handoff builder
Start with strict boundaries, not a blank prompt.
Every field maps to the signed schema. Monetary authority defaults to NONE. No credential, password, client secret, or signing-key field exists.
Adversarial safety lab
Prove the boundary by attacking it safely.
Six isolated synthetic requests test expansion, spending, recipient binding, versions, replay conflict, and signature integrity through the real policy engine.
No attacks run for this workspace yet.
Evidence panel
Verified proof only.
Current values come from the persisted aggregate, ordered events, receipt verifier, and unchanged-state attack checks. No live rate-exhaustion claim is made.
Ordered event history JSON
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Completion receipt JSON
Not available until completion.